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Gendering the Law of Occupation: The Case of 
Cyprus 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin 
Abstract 
The long-term occupation of Northern Cyprus provides some 
valuable insights into the gendered dimensions of the law of 
occupation. Specifically, close analysis of conflict-related 
patterns of sexual violence, the regulation of family relationships, 
and the challenge of sexual trafficking allows for a broader 
reassessment of the extent to which occupation law is ‘fit for 
purpose’ specifically as it regulates long-term transformative 
occupations. The law of occupation, in its original 
conceptualization, was assumed to have a short-term and 
utilitarian function, designed for the protection of land and 
people until the disputed territory was returned to its rightful 
sovereign. Long-term and belligerent territorial control of 
occupied territory has meant expanded patterns of exclusions and 
under-enforcement of law for women, and in particular 
illustrates the opaque under-regulation of the private sphere 
under occupation, generally to the detriment of women’s 
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protection and entitlements. This article exposes those gendered 
tensions with a focus on one case-study but with broader reach to 
multiple sites of occupation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The law of occupation can rightly be considered a highly 
specialized sub-division of the law of armed conflict.1 Its 
genealogy is long, and its content, like much of the law that 
regulates the conduct of hostilities between states or between 
state and non-state actors, is routine, pedantic, and highly 
ritualized.2 Despite its long history, the law of occupation has 
received much less scholarly and policy attention than other 
parts of the law regulating war. While the law of armed conflict 
has historically ignored the experiences and challenges faced by 
women—whether as civilians or combatants—in situations of 
armed conflict, the law of occupation has been distinctly bereft 
of scholarly and policy interest.3 Thus, there is little sustained 
legal analysis of women’s rights, obligations and challenges 
under occupation as well as no lasting analysis of the structural 
limits and gender capture of the law of occupation.4 This article 
addresses that gap with a focus on the long-term occupation of 
Northern Cyrus by Turkish forces, emphasizing the experiences 
of women during hostilities and the ongoing occupation. Based 
on fieldwork conducted in Cyprus in the autumn of 2016, the 
article draws on interview data, field observations, and 
secondary sources. Section I of the article addresses the history 
of the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. Section II outlines 
the protracted process of peace negotiations on the Island, and 
 
 1. Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and 
Answers, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/
eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm. 
 2. See, e.g., id.; International law on the conduct of hostilities: overview, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-
and-law/conduct-hostilities/overview-conduct-of-hostilities.htm (discussing 
various dimensions of the applicable law of occupation). 
 3. Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the 
Silence?, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 55 (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., Jody M. Prescott, NATO Gender Mainstreaming and the 
Feminist Critique of the Law of Armed Conflict, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 83 
(2013); CHARLOTTE LINDSEY, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WOMEN FACING 
WAR, 22 (2002); JUDITH GARDAM, A New Frontline for Feminism and 
International Humanitarian Law, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 217–32 (Margaret Davies & Vanessa Munro eds., 
2013) (discussing gender and the law of armed conflict generally). 
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the consistent failure to reach a comprehensive peace settlement 
among the parties. The failure to substantively include women 
in the negotiation process, as well as the lack of a gender 
dimension to the negotiation content, is also highlighted. The 
article then proceeds to Section III, outlining the history of 
gendered violence during and after the invasion of the Island. 
This sets the stage to discuss the gendered exclusions that shape 
women’s experiences of the occupation since 1974 in Section IV. 
Here, the focus is on private and family life, demonstrating how 
the law of occupation fails to regulate the private sphere, thereby 
creating significant regulatory gaps for women. The lack of 
regulation is compounded by the transformative and sustained 
nature of the occupation impinging on every aspect of public and 
private life. In exposing the centrality of the public/private 
divide to the structure of occupation law, the article underscores 
the exclusion and marginalization experienced by women living 
under occupation. Section V concludes the substantive analysis 
by addressing the ongoing complexity of violence and harm 
against women in the occupied territory, with a focus on 
trafficking under occupation. The gaps in the regulatory scope of 
the fourth Geneva Convention allied with the lack of 
international recognition for the territory demonstrate the ways 
in which the limits of the law itself can be a grave impediment 
to engaging the rights and protections due to women during 
occupation. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
The Cyprus Occupation formally began on July 20, 1974, 
when Turkish forces, citing the Treaty of Guarantee under the 
London and Geneva Agreements of 1959–1960 and in response 
to a Greek junta-supported coup to topple the elected President 
of the Republic of Cyprus, invaded the Island to ostensibly 
protect the Turkish Cypriots. By August 15th Turkey occupied 
thirty-seven percent of territory in the Northeastern part of the 
Island of Cyprus.5 During the invasion, the forces expelled Greek 
Cypriots from the North and took “effective control” of that part 
of the Island.6 Immediately after the invasion, the U.N. Security 
 
 5. David Wippman, International Law, Ethnic Conflict, and the Example 
of Cyprus, 22 CORNELL L.F. 9, 10 (1995). 
 6. PANKYPRIOS DIKĒGORIKOS SYLLOGOS, EUROPEAN COMM’N H.R., 
HUMAN RIGHTS: TURKEY’S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CYPRUS: 
FINDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONTINUING 
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Council adopted a resolution that called for “all states to respect 
the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of 
Cyprus” and called for “an immediate end to foreign 
intervention” from the Island.7 Based on the resolution, the 
governments of Britain, Greece, and Turkey engaged in talks for 
the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the preservation of 
Cypriot sovereignty.8 Following differences in opinion over the 
reunification of Cyprus, Turkey broke off negotiations on August 
14, 1974, and has since held a third of the Island.9 This 
occupation continues to provoke condemnation and Turkey 
remains the only country to recognize the subsequent formation 
of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) within the 
occupied area.10 The terminology of occupation is somewhat 
fraught on the Island; anecdotally, during fieldwork, I was told 
that a singular preoccupation with the occupation 
characterization of conflict involves narrative complexities 
which overplay who was a victim and who was a perpetrator in 
the conflict,11 emphasizing externalities rather than on the bi-
communal nature of co-existence challenges and broader issues 
of discrimination and equality between Greek and Turkish 
 
VIOLATIONS BY TURKEY ¶ 8 (1986) (estimating that 140,000-200,000 Greek 
Cypriots were removed from Northern Cyprus immediately or right after the 
occupation started, among whom thousands were wounded and many were 
missing); JAMES KER-LINDSAY, THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 41–42 (2011); Eugene Rossides, Cyprus and the Rule of Law, 
17 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 21, 24 (1991) (discussing that the United Nation 
Committee for Missing Persons has worked to identify the remains of missing 
persons); Northern Cyprus, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Northern_Cyprus (lasted visited Oct. 29, 2017) (“Northern Cyprus extends from 
the tip of the Karpass Peninsula in the northeast to Morphou Bay, Cape 
Kormakitis and its westernmost point, the Kokkina exclave in the west. Its 
southernmost point is the village of Lourouijna.”). 
 7. S.C. Res. 353, ¶ 1–3 (July 20, 1974). See also S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR, 
29th Sess., 1781st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/11350 (July 20, 1974). 
 8. David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 141, 145 (1996). 
 9. Id. at 147. 
 10. See Rossides, supra note 6, at 25–26. 
 11. This terminology is used largely by nationalist Greek Cypriots, and not 
by Turkish Cypriots. There is also a discourse around two occupations—the first 
‘occupation of the government’ followed by military occupation by the Turks. 
More recently, tensions in Northern Cyprus have taken on another layer, as 
secular Cypriot Turks are chafing under the increased Islamic emphasis from 
Turkey. As McGarry points out, “[f]or Turkish Cypriots to abandon their single 
region would be to jeopardize not just collective self-determination, but their 
security, and would be seen as a step backward, reviving their traumatic 
memories of being enclaved.” John McGarry, Centripetalism, Consociationalism 
and Cyrus: The “Adoptability” Question, 65 POL. STUD. 512, 523 (2017). 
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Cypriots. As in every ethno-national conflict, there exist 
different and often competing narratives and the case of Cyprus 
is no exception. 
The territory is distinctly divided by a physical buffer zone 
(called the demilitarized zone or “Green Line”), which is manned 
both militarily and electronically by military personnel from the 
Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot soldiers (bolstered by 
Turkish military personnel).12 The ceasefire lines extend 
approximately 180 miles and cover about three percent of the 
Island.13 A United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) has been deployed to Cyprus under United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 186 since March 1964, with troop 
levels broadly held around 850.14 The UNFICYP maintains a 
surveillance system through observation posts many of which 
involve electronic surveillance, complicated by the absence of a 
formal ceasefire agreement between the parties.15 
Approximately 30,000–35,000 Turkish troops are estimated to 
be currently occupying the territory of Northern Cyprus.16 
Access to either side required passing through a security and 
passport checkpoint. The conflict can be described as “frozen,” 
where despite high levels of political engagement from multiple 
actors over many decades, territorial and political antagonisms 
have remained static.17 The inter-communal exchange is limited 
 
 12. See About the Buffer Zone, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN 
CYPRUS, https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about-buffer-zone (last visited Oct. 30, 
2017). 
 13. Id. 
 14. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, U.N. PEACEKEEPING 
FORCE IN CYPRUS: ABOUT, https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2017). 
 15. A. Walter Dorn, Electronic Eyes on the Green Line: Surveillance by the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 29 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 
184, 185, 188 (2014). 
 16. Renewed Cyprus Talks Set to Begin in Switzerland, AL JAZEERA (June 
27, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/renewed-cyprus-talks-set-
switzerland-170627175135875.html (discussing that “[t]erritory, property, 
governance and power-sharing were ‘make or break’ issues” and that “[t]he two 
sides have also been diametrically opposed on security, especially the presence 
of about 30,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus.”). See also Arthur Beesley 
& Kerin Hope, Cyprus Rivals Restart Talks over Reuniting Island, FIN. TIMES 
(June 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ad4494c4-599f-11e7-b553-
e2df1b0c3220 (“The presence of up to 35,000 Turkish troops Cyprus remains 
the most contentious question. After talks in January Turkey’s president Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan insisted on his country’s right to maintain troops in Cyprus ‘for 
ever.”). 
 17. See McGarry, supra note 11, at 513 (“Cyprus is a partitioned polity 
which currently lacks any common power-sharing institutions. Indeed, no 
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and fraught on both sides.18 Over the decades, however, many 
inter-ethnic contacts and conflict resolution groups have worked 
together on different projects and produced alternative 
narratives and documents to the official discourse across the 
divide. Not coincidentally, the membership of these groups has 
been dominated by women.19 
Membership of the European Community has been 
singularly important not only in shaping peace negotiations but 
also in defined debates concerning citizenship and identity on 
the Island.20 Both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are 
considered European Union (EU) citizens, but ‘settlers’ to 
Turkish occupied Cyprus are not entitled to European identity 
cards.21 Because of the continued division of Cyprus, however, 
Turkish Cypriots have little voice within the EU and are not 
represented within the Cypriot delegation.22 In addition to its 
representation in the EU, the Cypriot delegation is also entitled 
to nominate three representatives and three substitutes to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.23 Within this 
 
functioning common institutions have existed in Cyprus since its consociational 
arrangements collapsed in December 1963, 11 years before Turkey’s partition 
in 1974.”). 
 18. During my fieldwork, I attended a major but unusual inter-communal 
event that was the presentation of the play Antigone in an old Roman 
amphitheatre in the North. Dozens of buses and cars departed from the town of 
Nicosia taking attendants to this cultural event. Notably, attendance in this bi-
communal cultural event was critiqued by nationalist and conservative Greek 
Cypriot commentators. See Angelos Anastasiou, Cypriots, foreigners pack 
Salamina Theatre Amid Criticism, CYPRUS MAIL ONLINE (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://cyprus-mail.com/2016/09/29/cypriots-foreigners-pack-salamina-theatre-
amid-criticism/. 
 19. One such project is the Home of Cooperation in the buffer zone between 
the two sides in Nicosia which houses the Bicommunal NGO the Association of 
Historical Dialogue and Research. See Maria Hadjipavlou, The “Crossings” 
along the Divide: The Cypriot Experience, in THE WALLS BETWEEN CONFLICT 
AND PEACE 197–216 (Alberto Gasparini ed., 2017); Maria Hadjipavlou, Cypriot 
Citizens’ Peacebuilding Efforts towards Reconciliation, 19(1) AUSTRIAN REV. OF 
INT’L & EURO. L. 133 (2017). 
 20. Andreas Rinke & Gulsen Solaker, Cyprus Remains Stumbling Block in 
Turkey’s EU Ambition: Merkel, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2013 1:05 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-eu/cyprus-remains-
stumbling-block-in-turkeys-eu-ambition-merkel-idUSBRE91O10L20130225. 
 21. Cyprus, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/coun
tries/member-countries/cyprus_en (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
 22. Internet to Inform the Turkish Cypriots on European Union Matters, 
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE U.N. (Mar. 9, 1999) 
http://www.cyprusun.org/?p=159. 
 23. PACE: Relations with Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, 
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF N. CYPRUS: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., 
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delegation, the Council of Europe has granted two seats to Greek 
Cypriots and one seat to Turkish Cypriots.24 Despite this 
allotment, the current Cyprus delegation only includes two 
Greek Cypriot representatives and two substitutes.25 There have 
been repeated attempts, namely after the Greek Cypriots voted 
against ratifying negotiations, to work more closely with the 
Turkish Cypriot community and include them in debates on 
European Political affairs, but none have come to fruition.26 
Despite the lack of progress on comprehensive settlement of 
the conflict, legal challenges to the occupation have framed the 
ways in which the occupier discharges its legal obligations. Much 
of this litigation has taken place at the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). For example, in Loizidou v. Turkey 
(1996), the ECtHR ruled that Turkey was responsible for 
violating the rights of Greek Cypriots who were displaced during 
the 1974 Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus.27 In Xenides-
Arestis v. Turkey (2005) the ECtHR found that the remedies put 
in place by the TRNC, following the Loizidou decision, were 
inadequate to address such property claims.28 The ECtHR 
ordered Turkey to introduce a remedy for effective redress.29 In 
response, the TRNC passed Law 67/2005 Compensation, 
Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties, which 
created the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) as a means 
of settling such property disputes.30 The IPC officially began its 
 
http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/foreign-policy/international-organisations/council-of-
europe/pace/ (lasted visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
 24. Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1113 ¶ 10 (Jan. 29, 1997). 
 25. “Elected Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Community” Will Be 
Able to Sit in the Chamber, COUNCIL OF EUR. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY: 
NEWS (Apr. 10, 2004), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.
asp?newsid=331&lang=2. See also Cyprus, COUNCIL OF EUR. PARLIAMENTARY 
ASSEMBLY, http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/AL-XML2HTM
L-EN.asp?lang=en&XmlID=NationalDelegation-cy (last visited Oct. 30, 2017). 
 26. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1376 (Apr. 29, 2004); Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 
1628 (Oct. 1, 2008). 
 27. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2236. 
 28. Xenides Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 
22, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-71800. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, Remedying Displacement in Frozen 
Conflict: Lessons from the Case of Cyprus, 18 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL 
STUD. 152, 158–59 (2016) (“[T]he Commission is an organ that is clouded in 
secrecy, which creates difficulties if one’s objective is to examine its practical 
effectiveness . . . . Few applicants openly admit that they have gone to the IPC 
because those who do are labelled among many in the GC community as 
‘traitors,’ as collaborating with the ‘enemy’ and selling their patrimonial land 
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activities on March 17, 2006. In Demopoulos v. Turkey (2010), 
the ECtHR ruled that the IPC was an effective local remedy that 
must be exhausted before claims can be brought before the 
ECtHR.31 
II. HISTORY OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN CYPRUS 
The European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United 
Nations have made ongoing efforts to bring about a negotiated 
settlement in the Cypriot conflict. Since the start of the 
occupation, international actors have also put pressure on 
Turkey to withdraw forces and recognize the legitimacy of the 
Cypriot government.32 In addition, throughout Cypriot history, 
the United Nations (U.N.) has played an active role in 
preserving peace and relations between the two communities.33 
Since 1964, citing their Article 2 (4) obligations under the U.N. 
Charter and to preserve peace between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities, the U.N. has maintained a peacekeeping 
force on the Island.34 These efforts represent the largest direct 
intervention that international actors have made in Cyprus.35 
Since the start of the occupation, the UNFICYP has repeatedly 
 
for financial gain.”). Contra Elena Katselli Proukaki, The Right of Displaced 
Persons to Property and to Return Home after Demopoulos, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
701, 702–03 (2014) (arguing that the decisions of European Court of Human 
Rights only provide a framework on property and not a resolution of the thornier 
issues); Rhodri C. Williams & Ayla Gürel, The European Court of Human Rights 
and the Cyprus Property Issues: Charting a Way Forward 1 (PEACE RES. INST. 
OSLO CYPRUS CTR., Paper 1/2011), https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.
ashx?id=388&type=publicationfile (“[T]he decisions of the Court serve only to 
define the outer parameters within which the parties have a degree of political 
space to arrive at a mutually acceptable compromise. In seeking to contribute 
to a better appreciation of these parameters, we maintain that the Court’s 
recent judgments do no more—and no less—than to exclude the more extreme 
aspects of the proposals that have been put forward by both sides.”). 
 31. Demopoulos v. Turkey, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 365. 
 32. See, e.g., Resolution on Cyprus, EUR. PARL. O.J. (C 117) 15 1996 
(encouraging Turkey to allow greater European access to Northern Cyprus); 
Motion for a Resolution to Wind up the Debate on the Statement by the Vice-
President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy on Turkish Actions Creating Tensions in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus (2014/2921(RSP)), EUR. PARL. DOC. B8-
0211/2014 (2014) (calling Turkey to recognize Cypriot sovereignty as a matter 
of international law). 
 33. S.C. Res. 186, ¶ 4 (Feb. 27, 1964). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Norrie MacQueen, The UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 5 CABLE 
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.cablemagazine.scot/cyprus/. 
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shifted its strategies to maintain the ceasefire line and preserve 
the existing peace with the final goal of reaching a resolution for 
foreign troop withdrawal.36 The ceasefire line was drawn in 1974 
and remains frozen in time.37 The UNFICYP forces are currently 
active in Cyprus and have stated that they plan to remain active 
until an agreement between the two Cypriot communities is 
reached.38 A status of force agreement has been consistently 
renewed to maintain the presence of peacekeeping troops on the 
Island.39 Over the years, the UNFICYP has negotiated “mini” 
agreements with the respective militaries to lower the potential 
for an unexpected escalation of military tensions; the 
agreements include patrolling of the demilitarized zone, 
demarcating the zone, and installing CCTV cameras and 
electronic surveillance with agreed access to de-escalate or 
prevent firefights among the trigger-happy sentries placed by 
the military authorities on both sides.40 
In addition to its work through the UNFICYP, the U.N. has 
also facilitated peace talks between the two sides. In 1999, the 
U.N. Security Council called upon the two sides “to work 
constructively” with the Secretary-General to reach a 
comprehensive peace agreement.41 This culminated in an 
agreement in 2004, known as the “Comprehensive Settlement of 
the Cyprus Problem.”42 The plan called for the withdrawal of 
Turkish troops, resettlement for displaced persons during the 
 
 36. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 365, ¶ 4 (Dec. 13, 1974); S.C. Res. 1251, ¶ 8 (June 29, 
1999) (reiterating UNFICYP role in preserving peace at ceasefire line); S.C. Res. 
1486, ¶ 3 (May 27, 2003) (extending civilian troops to ease restrictions on 
civilian restrictions on travel across the ceasefire). 
 37. See About the Buffer Zone, supra note 12. 
 38. See S.C. Res. 2234, ¶ 7 (July 29, 2015). 
 39. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1847 (Dec. 12, 2008); S.C. Res. 1873 (May 29, 2009); 
S.C. Res. 1898 (Dec. 14, 2009); S.C. Res. 1930 (June 15, 2010); S.C. Res. 1953 
(Dec. 14, 2010); S.C. Res. 1986 (June 13, 2011); S.C. Res. 2026 (Dec. 14, 2011); 
S.C. Res. 2058 (July 19, 2012); S.C. Res. 2089 (Jan. 24, 2013); S.C. Res. 2114 
(July 30, 2013); S.C. Res. 2135 (Jan. 30, 2014); S.C. Res. 2168 (July 30, 2014); 
S.C. Res. 2197 (Jan. 29, 2015); S.C. Res. 2234 (July 29, 2015); S.C. Res. 2263 
(Jan. 28, 2016); S.C. Res. 2300 (July 26, 2016) (each resolution extending the 
mandate for six months at a time, evidencing the solution’s highly impermanent 
nature to a quasi-permanent peacekeeping presence). 
 40. Interview with U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYP) 
personnel that the author wishes to keep anonymous. Sources verified by the 
Journal. (Sept. 28, 2016). 
 41. S.C. Res. 1250, ¶ 8 (June 29, 1999). 
 42. UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan of the Cyprus Question (Mar. 31, 
2004), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/un-comprehensive-settlement-plan-of-the-cyprus-
question.en.mfa. 
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original period of conflict, the citizenship of Turkish immigrants, 
and a strengthening of a bizonal character of a unified Cyprus.43 
The Security Council unanimously adopted the proposal and 
gave their full support to the negotiated settlement.44 The 
European Parliament, with the Cypriot ascension into the EU 
looming, also voiced unequivocal support of the plan and stated 
that it could serve as a “shining example for handling . . . 
difficult international issues.”45 Ultimately, the resolution failed 
after Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly voted against the 
agreement.46 
Four years later, in September 2008, the Secretary-General 
assisted the two Cypriot communities in negotiating another 
comprehensive settlement.47 The settlement focused on a 
reduction in military exercises, freedom of civilian movement 
between the two sides of the federation, and reduced tensions 
along the green line.48 Some have attributed the failure of this 
negotiation to the world recession and the changing economic 
conditions in Cyprus, which limited tolerance for a peace deal 
with considerable economic costs.49 Since these talks, there have 
been further efforts to negotiate a settlement, but none have yet 
reached a solution.50 At the time of writing this Article, the peace 
talks are currently at a stand-still.51 The parties remain unable 
to reach an agreement, despite the “shuttle diplomacy” efforts 
provided by the Special Adviser of the U.N. Secretary-General 
on Cyprus, Mr. Espen Barth Eide, during the last round of 
 
 43. Id. at annex 4, art. 3; arts. 7(3), 3, 2(1)(a). 
 44. S.C. Res. 1475, ¶ 4 (Apr. 14, 2003). 
 45. EUR. PARL. DOC. (P5_TA) 0347 (2004). 
 46. See Ahmet Sözen, The Cyprus Question in Turkey—EU Relations, in 
THE POLITICS OF EU ACCESSION: TURKISH CHALLENGES AND CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES 72–89,78–81 (Lucie Tunkrová & Pavel Ŝaradín eds., 
2010). 
 47. S.C. Res. 1847 (Dec. 12, 2008). 
 48. Id. 
 49. What Happened in Cyprus, ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/03/interview-athanasios-
orphanides. See also CAROL MIGDALOVITZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33497, 
CYPRUS: STATUS OF U.N. NEGOTIATIONS AND RELATED ISSUES 10 (July 20, 
2007), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33497.pdf (listing “doubt about the 
economic viability of the Plan and the concern about its harm to the Greek 
Cypriot standard of living” as a reason for rejecting the Plan). 
 50. MIGDALOVITZ, supra note 49, at 1. 
 51. Helena Smith, Cyprus Reunification Talks to Resume, Says UN 
Secretary-General, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2017, 8:32 EDT), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/cyprus-reunification-talks-to-resume-says-un-
chief-security-power-sharing-divided-island. 
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negotiations (May 17–26, 2017).52 In 2017, Secretary-General 
Guterres announced he would host a joint meeting in June 2017, 
between the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akinci, the Greek 
Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and Mr. Eide.53 Progress 
towards formal talks remains in “stop-start” mode.54 These 
recent efforts have given renewed optimism for an agreed 
settlement, but no tangible outcome has been reached.55 
During these multiple mediation attempts, no female 
negotiator has been appointed to the Cyprus conflict.56 In 
underscoring the exclusion of women from the negotiation 
process, I caution on an essential proposition that more women 
in the negotiation process would necessarily mean better peace 
or a gender-friendly peace settlement. Women hold a variety of 
views on war and peace, and this is no less true of Cyprus than 
it is of any other conflict.57 Nonetheless, rigid constructions 
defining the narrative of the causes and fixes of the conflict 
dominate the portrayal of gender and the Cyprus conflict. 
Women are stereotypically portrayed as mothers, and helpless 
victims of the war, affirming masculine virtues of security and 
 
 52. Statement by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus, 
Mr. Espen Barth Eide, UN CYPRUS TALKS (May 26, 2017), 
http://www.uncyprustalks.org/statement-by-the-special-adviser-of-the-
secretary-general-on-cyprus-mr-espen-barth-eide-2/. 
 53. UN Chief Announces New Talks on Cyprus Reunification in June, 
DAILY MAIL (June 4, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-
4572002/UN-chief-hosts-peace-talks-rival-Cypriot-leaders.html. 
 54. Tony Barber, Europe’s Coming War over Cyprus, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 
23, 1997, at 16. 
 55. Smith, supra note 51. 
 56. PEACE RESEARCH INST. OSLO (PRIO) CYPRUS CENTRE, WOMEN’S PEACE 
IN CYPRUS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENDER ADVISORY TEAM (GAT) ON 
IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1325 PROVISIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 8 
(2012), https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=442&type=publi
cationfile [hereinafter PRIO]. See generally Christine Bell & Catherine 
O’Rourke, Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 
1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 941, 948 
n.26 (2010) (finding that 99% of mediators who negotiate in peace processes are 
male). 
 57. A 2012 study by the Interpeace Initiative, Cyprus 2015, and the Centre 
for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) found significant 
gender discrepancies over the political impact of a settlement. Specifically, 
among Turkish Cypriot women, as opposed to Turkish Cypriot men, there were 
significantly higher concerns that a settlement could lead to economic failure. 
Among Greek Cypriot women, there were significantly higher concerns that 
further negotiation could lead to renewed conflict. In this survey, women were 
found to be less open to reconciliation than men. See Gender Participation in 
the Peace Talks, INTERPEACE 6 (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.interpeace.org/
resource/gender-participation-in-the-peace-talks/. 
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militarism to protect them, translating into peace agreement 
positions that are highly protectionist towards women but do not 
take a transformative approach to the necessity of protecting 
women’s rights in a post-conflict Cyprus.58 
A. GENDER DIMENSIONS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN CYPRUS 
Cyprus remains a highly traditional hetero-patriarchal 
society. Despite its membership of the European Union, it faces 
broad challenges in achieving gender equality and in meeting 
European notions of political equality.59 Cyprus ranks among 
the three lowest countries in the European Union for the 
representation of women in politics; only 10.7 percent of all 
political offices are held by women.60 Society remains culturally 
conservative, with expectations of marriage and motherhood 
dominant in social expectations for women’s lives.61 
Women’s experience of the conflict and occupation of Cyprus 
has been largely absent from conflict narratives. In turn, women 
have struggled to have the gender dimensions of the conflict, 
occupation, and peace process reflect their experiences and civil 
society roles. Even following the passage of U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1325 in 2001, which mandated the greater 
 
 58. FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN ET AL., ON THE FRONTLINE: GENDER, WAR, AND 
THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS 49–55 (2011); see also Laura Sjoberg, Gendered 
Realities of the Immunity Principle: Why Gender Analysis Needs Feminism, 
50(4) INT’L STUD. Q. 889, 897 (2006): Women and War, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS 2–3 (June 19, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0944-women-
and-war. In the context of Cyprus, Olga Demetriou notes: 
In Cyprus, women are not depicted as agents in the war effort, neither 
for the Turkish-Cypriots in the 1960s, nor for Greek-Cypriots in 1974. 
The acknowledgment of their involvement, rare as it is, extends 
normally to feeding and sheltering: in commemorative TV programs, 
mention is made of Greek-Cypriot women who hid soldiers at home, 
fed them, or helped them escape into safe territory as the Turkish 
army was advancing. 
OLGA DEMETRIOU, REFUGEEHOOD AND THE POST-CONFLICT SUBJECT: 
RECONSIDERING MINOR LOSSES, (forthcoming 2018) (Chapter 7: Unhomly 
Subjects) (on file with author). 
 59. See Kathambi Kinoti, The State of Women’s Rights in Cyprus, 
EUROPEAN WOMEN’S LOBBY (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.womenlobby.org/The-
State-of-Women-s-Rights-in-Cyprus. 
 60. Susana Pavlou, The Gender Gap in Women’s Leadership in Cyprus, 
MEDITERRANEAN INST. GENDER STUD. 3 (Mar. 16, 2015), http://thehubcy
.org/media/files/Women’s%20Leadership%20and%20Participation%20in%20D
ecision-making(1).pdf. 
 61. Id. at 14. 
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inclusion of women in peace-processes and peace negotiations,62 
the gendered dimensions of the conflict and occupation have 
struggled to gain any traction in the negotiation process.63 
Cyprus represents a valuable case study of the rhetorical tension 
in conflict management between claims of urgency, security and 
conflict resolution, given that Cyprus’ conflict has always been 
“presented as ‘urgent’ and everything else ‘secondary’, and 
because, despite the persistence over three generations now, ‘the 
Cyprus problem’ is likely to be outlived by the problem of gender 
inequality.”64 Women’s peace activism in Cyprus has a long and 
distinguished history.65 For example, in 2002 and 2003, as peace 
negotiations stalled, a bicommunal women’s non-governmental 
organization (NGO) staged peaceful protests in the northern and 
southern parts of Nicosia (crossing the Green line was forbidden 
at that time), demanding a negotiated settlement and an end to 
militarism.66 Consistent with many other conflicts and 
occupation contexts, women remained formally side-lined in 
negotiations, until 2012 when the U.N.’s Good Offices mission in 
Cyprus supported the incorporation of gender concerns in the 
peace negotiations.67 The establishment of a Gender Advisory 
Team (GAT) in 2009 enabled a channel of communication to the 
negotiation process that enabled a feminist and gender 
perspective on issues as diverse as governance, citizenship, and 
property.68 It constitutes a loose network of women, Greek-
 
 62. See generally NI AOLAIN ET AL., supra note 58, at 107–08 
(acknowledging that although the resolution was influential, it did not affect 
actual practices). 
 63. See id., at 207–210. 
 64. PRIO, supra note 56, at 16 (building on a broader commitment to 
ensuring the participation of civil society in the conflict resolution process in 
Cyprus). See S.C. Res. 1818, Preamble (June 13, 2008). 
 65. See Myria Vassiliadou, Questioning Nationalism: The Patriarchal and 
National Struggles of Cypriot Women Within a European Context, 9(4) EURO. J. 
WOMEN’S STUD. 459, 460 (2002). 
 66. PRIO, supra note 56, at 2. 
 67. Id. at 5–6. See also S.C. Res. 2106 (June 24, 2013). 
 68. PRIO, supra note 56, at 5. GAT is made up of civil society activists, 
academics and policy makers. GAT’s recommendations include provisions for 
strong, constitutionally entrenched equal rights and non-discrimination 
language in the Constitution of a United Federal Cyprus; health and social 
security for all women including homemakers; securing sexual and reproductive 
rights; equal gender representation in all levels of government as enabled by 
temporary special measures; gender balanced public decision-making bodies, 
including courts; the creation of special mechanisms to ensure gender equality 
across federal entities; and a demand for equal rights for men to acquire, 
change, or retain their citizenship (presently not the case under the 1960 
Cyprus Constitution which holds that ‘the wide belongs to the community of the 
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Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who have a variety of 
backgrounds including political advocacy, NGO work and 
academics. This channel comes in a context where no Cypriot 
women have sat at the negotiation table, and few women have 
significant leadership roles in institutions or structures that feed 
into the negotiation process.69 While the GAT represents an 
advance on the hitherto exclusion of women from the negotiation 
process, the composition of the group is privileged, and the GAT 
has struggled to incorporate the grassroots.70 Conversely, the 
Gender Equality Technical Committee, attached to the 
negotiations and providing input to negotiators as an official 
committee constrained by all the formal rules of the negotiation 
process and bi-communal engagement, means that in reality it 
has been given an enormous mandate with no meaningful 
authority.71 All members of the Committee undertake their work 
in a voluntary capacity and are checked in their ability to ‘do’ 
conflict-related work, as Committee members require collective 
approval to engage in activities.72 GAT members have reflected 
on whether the gender “capture” of the Committee reflects a 
tension of engagement “inside” rather than “outside” peace 
processes, and tension between process and substantive 
outcomes when women engage in formal peace making at the 
expense of their external advocacy.73 
 
husband.’). See Olga Demetriou & Maria Hadipaviou, The Impact of Women’s 
Activism on the Peace Negotiation in Cyprus (Working Paper, 2017) (on file with 
author). 
 69. PRIO, supra note 56, at 8. It should also be noted that the post 2004 
position that all negotiations be Cypriot led has significant gender implications. 
In practice, it means that the agreement will not be gender proofed by mediators 
with international expertise, advice can be given to the key (male) negotiators 
but there is no obligation to take account of any gender considerations in a Final 
Status agreement. 
 70. Interview with Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeoris, Professor, Soc. and 
Political Sci. Dep’t at the Univ. of Cyprus, in Nicosia, Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2016). 
See also Maria Hadjipavlou, No Permission to Cross: Cypriot Women’s Dialogue 
Across the Divide, 13(4) Gender, Place & Culture 329, 347 (2006). 
 71. See Statement by the Technical Committee on Gender Equality on the 
Occasion of International Women’s Day 2016, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
FORCE IN CYPRUS, https://unficyp.unmissions.org/statement-technical-
committee-gender-equality-occasion-international-womens-day-2016 (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2017); Gender Equality, UN Cyprus Talks, http://www.uncyprus
talks.org/gender-activities/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2017). 
 72. There is currently no published protocol on the Committee’s work, but 
members explained that the modalities of engagement are informally agreed 
and reported that they are working voluntarily. Interview with two serving 
Committee members, in Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2016). 
 73. Interview with Olga Demetriou, Senior Research Consultant, Peace 
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The engagement of women in conflict process and 
occupation regulation has been stymied by a number of 
intersecting factors including 1) a historical context which has 
not taken account of the specificity of women’s experiences 
(occupation, colonialism and ethnic nationalism)74 2) structural 
challenges including embedded patriarchy and hierarchical 
gender roles75 3) a highly masculine political culture, the deep 
public/private division in Cypriot life and the traction of gender 
stereotypes76 and 4) the internalization by women of their 
secondary and supportive roles, and social and personal barriers 
to public political engagement.77 Despite a strong emphasis in 
the Cypriot peace negotiations on ‘equality’ and ‘human rights,78 
meaning specifically ethnic and political identity-based equality 
and a narrowly defined set of civil and political rights, there has 
been a complete evacuation of gender equality and gendered 
human rights from the conception and implementation of 
substantive equality that has been dominant in the peace talks 
to date.79 The Cypriot political settlement in progress is 
generally unmoored from gender concerns and remains a vehicle 
for sustained patriarchal dialogue even as the language of 
human rights and transformation litter the landscape.80 
A defining element of the conflict and occupation in Cyprus 
has been the ways in which definition of discrimination and 
equality frame the negotiations towards a final settlement, and 
have in part defined the nature of the highly militarised 
occupation. An emphasis on identity is to be expected, given the 
modern history of exclusions which are ethnically determined on 
 
Research Inst. Oslo (PRIO), in Nicosia, Cyprus (Sept. 29, 2016). 
 74. See generally CYNTHIA COCKBURN, THE SPACE BETWEEN US: 
NEGOTIATING GENDER AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT 40–45 (1998) 
(exploring the relationship between nationalism and feminism); NIRA YUVAL-
DAVIS, GENDER AND NATION 119–20 (1977) (discussing feminism through a lens 
of identity politics and multi-culturalism). 
 75. See Lori Handrahan, Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction, 35(4) SEC. DIALOGUE 429, 431 (2004). 
 76. MARIA HADJIPAVLOU, WOMEN AND CHANGE IN CYPRUS: FEMINISMS AND 
GENDER IN CONFLICT 19–26 (2010). See generally Judy El-Bushra, 
Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of 
Conflict Process, in STATE OF CONFLICT: GENDER, VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE 
66–86, 80–82 (Susie Jacobs et al. eds., 2000) (exploring the range of identities 
both within and between genders). 
 77. PRIO, supra note 56, at 5. 
 78. UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan of the Cyprus Question, supra 
note 42, at arts. 2(1)(a), 2(1)(c), 4(1), 11(1), attachment 5. 
 79. PRIO, supra note 56, at 8. 
 80. See Maria Hadjipavlou, supra note 70, at 347. 
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the Island (specifically minority groups, and the effacement of 
hybrid identities). But the emphasis on identity as a result of 
conflict and occupation has excluded gender identity in distinct 
ways. First, identity is presumed to distribute along ethnic lines, 
entirely side-lining gender identity, or the intersection of gender 
identity with ethnic identity.81 Second, commentators have 
identified the dominance of “ideal” citizen; “this ideal citizen, in 
Cyprus, is male, belongs to a majority ethnicity (Greek-Cypriot / 
Turkish-Cypriot), and is the protector of the nation – thus, able-
bodied, masculine, heterosexual, and combat-ready.”82 In 
parallel, women are perceived as weaker, in need of protection,83 
vulnerable to the enemy and reproducers of two nations in 
military opposition.84 One outworking of these gender ideologies 
has been the privileging of the army, and the ways in which a 
long-standing occupation has framed the military as the central 
institution of the Cypriot state and territory under Turkish 
occupation on the Island.85 Given the masculinity of the military, 
its exclusion of women and the close connection between political 
power and military service, women’s non-status in the military 
has broader effects on their status and power in the civic and 
political affairs of the Island.86 
 
 
 81. See Stacey Burlet & Helen Reid, A Gendered Uprising: Political 
Representation and Minority Ethnic Communities, 21(2) ETHNIC & RACIAL 
STUD. 270, 271 (1998); V. Spike Peterson, The Politics of Identity and Gendered 
Nationalism, in FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ITS 
SECOND GENERATION 167, 180 (Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey & Patrick J. 
Haney eds., 1995) (Explaining a possible intersection of gender and ethnic 
identity by discussing how women are used to police the border of ethnic 
identity). 
 82. PRIO, supra note 56, at 24. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Floya Anthias, Women and Nationalism in Cyrpus, in WOMEN—
NATION—STATE 150, 155–60 (Nira Yuval-Davis et al. eds., 1989) (showing how 
women are perceived as reproducers who can reproduce for either side). 
 85. See PRIO, supra note 56, at 24 (showing that the privileged army is a 
“ideal citizen”). 
 86. See, e.g., Anthias, supra note 84, at 159–64 (discussing how women’s 
link to the family has affected their participation in the liberation struggle). See 
generally Stratis-Andreas Efthymiou, Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity 
in Post-2003 Cyprus 54, 229, 290 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Sussex). 
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III. GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE DURING THE 
INVASION AND OCCUPATION 
While the Cyprus conflict has broadly faded from public 
view, displaced by post-Cold War territorial disputes, genocides 
and asymmetrical conflicts in which a deadly mix of sectarian 
violence, terrorism, inter-state hostilities and low-high 
thresholds of violence are experienced, in its time the conflict 
was intense and riveting.87 While recent wars have brought 
significant attention to the experience of women as victims of 
conflict, Cyprus provided early motifs for much of the 
preoccupations that make women visible in contemporary 
wars.88 Significant evidence emerged early on that women were 
targeted for sexual and gender-based violence in the hostilities 
following Turkish military invasion of the Island.89 The early 
territorial gains by the Turkish army as it invaded Cyprus set 
the stage for significant and reported sexual violence against 
women.90 As reported by Roussou: 
 
 
 87. See Miltos Miltiadou, Letter to the Editor, Cyprus Continues to Be 
Victimized by Turkey, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Aug. 12, 1994, at 23A 
(explaining how Turkey continues to occupy Cyprus with impunity). 
 88. See generally Doris E. Buss, Rethinking ‘Rape as a Weapon of War,’ 17 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 145 (2009) (discussing the recent interest in finding 
rape as a weapon of war among feminists); Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: 
Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5(2) HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 243 (1994) (explaining how the interest in rape as a weapon of 
war has only recently begun receiving international attention). 
 89. See Anna M Agathangelou, Nationalist Narratives and (Dis)Appearing 
Women: State-Sanctioned Sexual Violence, 19(4) CANADIAN WOMEN STUD. 12, 
12–14 (2000) [hereinafter Agathangelou]; Anna M. Agathangelou & Kyle D. 
Killian, The Discourse of Refugee Trauma: Epistemologies of the Displaced, the 
State, and Mental Health Practitioners, 21(1) CYPRUS REV. 19, 43 (2009) 
[hereinafter Killian]; Olga Demetriou, The Militarization of Opulence: 
Engendering a Conflict Heritage Site, 14(1) INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 56, 63–64 
(2012); Villagers Driven from Cyprus Homes Charge Murder and Rape by Turks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1974, at 70; Alexander Cockburn, How About Turkey’s 
‘Aggression’ Against Cyprus?: Viewpoint, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1982, at 27; 
Joseph Fitchett, Pressure Builds for Council of Europe to Condemn Turkish Acts 
on Cyprus, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1977, at B4; Girl Tells of Rapes, Killings on 
Cyprus, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1974, at 33; Miltiadou, supra note 87; Gene 
Rossides, What About Turkey’s War Criminals?, HELLENIC TIMES (N.Y.C.), July 
25, 2008, at 4. 
 90. See Maria Roussou, War in Cyprus: Patriarchy and the Penelope Myth, 
in WOMEN & POLITICAL CONFLICT: PORTRAITS OF STRUGGLE IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
25, 25–26 (Rosemary Ridd & Helen Callaway eds., 1987) (recounting the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the immediate aftermath). 
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In the summer of 1974, the Turkish army invaded 
Cyprus . . . Greek Cypriots living in this northern section 
fled for their lives—on foot, in cars, in tractors, or by 
whatever means of transport they could find. Over 
200,000 became refugees. The 20,000 left behind—
mainly women, children and the elderly—found 
themselves “enclaved” (the official term used by the 
Greek Cypriot government to describe those Greek 
Cypriots who remained or were forced to remain in the 
Turkish-controlled area) at the mercy of the Turkish 
soldiers.91 
Evidence of sexual violence against Greek Cypriot women 
was contained in the legal arguments advanced in the interstate 
Cyprus v. Turkey case, which addressed a range of European 
Convention violations instigated by the invasion and its 
aftermath.92 
On 21 March 1975, the applicant Government submitted 
this application to the Commission in the following terms: 
. . . 3. In the said Turkish occupied areas the following 
atrocities and crimes were committed by way of 
systematic conduct by Turkey’s state organs in flagrant 
violation of the obligations of Turkey under the European 
Convention on Human Rights during the period from 19 
September 1974 until the filing of the present 
Application: 
. . . (b) Wholesale and repeated rapes. Even women of 
ages up to 80 were savagely raped by members of the 
Turkish forces. In some areas forced prostitution of 
Greek Cypriot girls continues to be practiced. Many 
women who remained in the Turkish occupied areas 
became pregnant as a result of the rapes committed by 
the Turkish troops.93 
In the course of its submissions, the Cypriot government 
complained of “wholesale and repeated rapes of women of all 
ages from twelve to seventy-one, sometimes to such an extent 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 6780/74 & 6950/75, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 1, 10–14 (1976). 
 93. Id. at 11. 
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that the victims suffered hemorrhages [sic] or became mental 
wrecks.”94 The government also claimed that in areas under 
Turkish occupation enforced prostitution was practiced, 
systematic rape (multiple rape of the same victim by multiple 
perpetrators), public rape (including women experiencing rape 
in front of their children and family members), aggravated rape 
(sexual violence accompanied by severe violence including but 
not limited to head trauma and near suffocation), and 
rape/murder nexus (where women were immediately killed 
following their sexual violation) were common.95 Those targeted 
included pregnant women and women who were mentally 
retarded.96 The government pleadings also included claims that 
women who were victims of rape by Turkish soldiers noted 
several recorded cases of abortion at the British base.97 In total, 
the European Commission addressed “written statements of 41 
alleged victims of rape . . . of four alleged eye-witnesses of 
rape . . . and of 24 hearsay witnesses of rape . . . .”98 In its formal 
findings, the Commission held that the rapes were committed by 
soldiers, including Turkish officers, and that the rapes were not 
“isolated cases of indiscipline.”99 The Commission held that the 
Turkish authorities did not take any action to prevent sexual 
violence, nor punish its occurrence, and considered the non-
prevention imputable to Turkey under the Convention.100 The 
Commission concluded that the incidents of rape established in 
the factual findings constituted “inhuman treatment” under 
Article 3 of the Convention.101 
Secondary sources affirm and provide greater detail on the 
experiences of women including harrowing detail on the efforts 
made by women to avoid sexual assault: 
One woman related her experience: I saw him (the 
Turkish soldier) still over me and I noticed others 
showing that they approved of what he had done to 
me . . . . Then he took my watch and engagement ring. 
 
 94. Id. at 120. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 122. 
 98. Id. at 123; see also Roussou, supra note 90, at 33 (detailing the 
testimony of rape victims and eye-witnesses to rape). 
 99. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 6780/74 & 6980/75, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 1, 124 (1976). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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Immediately afterwards another threw me to the ground 
and started to undress me, with the same intention as 
the first . . . I staggered in the direction of the other 
women, and caught up with them. I saw a two year old 
[sic] boy and took him in my arms, even though I was 
losing my strength, hoping this would save my life. While 
I was holding the little boy, some Turks surrounded us 
again, and one of them started pulling me . . . . As we 
were walking towards Six Mile Beach, we found some 
charcoal and I used it to make my face black, to look old, 
hoping to avoid being raped again.102 
A few notable features of the account of extensive rape in 
Cyprus bear closer examination. First, there are no 
comprehensive statistics available on the total number of 
victims.103 Despite widespread knowledge of these harms, 
quantification has remained elusive.104 Second, the lack of 
confirmed data connects to the challenges in tracing women who 
scattered during the invasion and remained in various parts of 
the south of the island thereafter.105 The lack of exposure is 
compounded by the accounts that note that “[t]hose Cypriot 
women who survived these dreadful experiences, particularly 
those who did not become pregnant, hid their ‘painful secret’ 
deep within themselves and tried to start a new life.”106 Notably, 
while sexual violence threaded through the accounts of the 
conflict in important and legally significant ways at the time of 
the invasion, it was erased in memory and political discussions 
soon thereafter.107 More recent attempts to address the needs of 
rape victims have demonstrated both erasure of narratives and 
the inter-ethnic blame game being deployed to shut down public 
dialogue. Olga Demetriou demonstrates that conversations 
about rape devolve into either charged defences of militaries and 
the reverse charge of ethnic slurring, or impassioned pleas for 
 
 102. Roussou, supra note 90, at 33. 
 103. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh 
Periodic Reports of Cyprus, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6–7 (2013) 
(expressing concerns about inadequate statistical data). 
 104. Id. See also Agathangelou, supra note 89, at 13–14. 
 105. Agathangelou, supra note 89, at 13–14; Killian, supra note 89, at 11–
12. 
 106. Roussou, supra note 90, at 34. 
 107. See INTERPEACE, supra note 57, at 2–3 (explaining how women are 
excluded from the peace talks in Cyprus). 
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better social support to rape victims by the states.108 As the 
account of the nascent peace process details above, women are 
barely visible in the negotiations, and sexual violence and its 
long-term consequences for victims and communities are 
scarcely mentioned as part of the accounting that would be 
necessary in a new political dispensation.109 Moreover, despite 
providing early legal recognition of sexual violence in conflict as 
a human rights violation, the Cyprus experience provided little 
lasting impact upon international legal norms related to conflict-
related sexual violence.110 Rather, that heavy lifting was done by 
another European conflict decades later, as the collapse of the 
Former Yugoslavia gave rise to systematic and sustained sexual 
violence.111 Moreover, the attention to sexual violence during the 
invasion and any link to ongoing issues of sexual exploitation on 
the island, particularly in respect of human trafficking (detailed 
below), has been largely ignored.112 It should be noted that we 
 
 108. Demetriou states “And yet, when questions about the rehabilitation of 
actual victims of war rapes were raised by feminist parliamentarians on both 
sides, alongside acknowledgements of the existence of Other victims, public 
opinion was scandalized. The Turkish-Cypriot parliamentarian Doğuş Derya 
who swore on her own oath in 2013, brought up the issue in 2014 and was 
castigated by colleagues and in social media for suggesting, ‘treasonously’, that 
Turkish soldiers raped. Having brought the threats she received to court, she 
was asked, as she took the stand, to explain ‘who raped who in 1974’: ‘men raped 
women’, she replied.” DEMETRIOU, supra note 58. 
 109. See id. at 3–4 (explaining how not including women in the process has 
long term consequences); Killian, supra note 89, at 41–45 (showing how 
narratives of sexual violence can be used to support patriarchy). 
 110. See Miltiadou, supra note 87 (showing that Cyprus has not engaged in 
the international legal process). 
 111. See WOMENAID INT’L, WARBURTON MISSION II REPORT: EC 
INVESTIGATIVE MISSION INTO THE TREATMENT OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ¶¶ 14–20 (Feb. 1993), http://www.womenaid.org/
press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.htm#Findings (concluding the rape of 
Muslim women was part of a “systematic” pattern of abuse); Kirsten Campbell, 
The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 411, 
413 (2007) (discussing the ICTY jurisprudence that shaped sexual violence 
crimes as prohibited by international humanitarian law); Rana Jaleel, Weapons 
of Sex, Weapons of War: Feminism, Ethnic Conflict and the Rise of Rape and 
Sexual Violence in Public International Law During the 1990s, 27(1) CULTURAL 
STUD. 115, 120–21 (2013) (discussing the enshrinement of “violence against 
women” within the international human rights framework); Mary Valentich, 
Rape Revisited: Sexual Violence Against Women in the Former Yugoslavia, 3(1) 
CANADIAN J. HUM. SEXUALITY 53, 53–56 (1994) (providing an overview of the 
sexual violence endured by the estimated 20,000 to 50,000 women raped in 
Yugoslavia). 
 112. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Cyprus: Trafficking in Persons Report (2016), 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258754.htm (designating 
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have no reliable statistics of levels of sexual and intimate 
partner violence in the TRNC, and limited means to gauge the 
effectiveness of legal remedies for crimes of sexual violence in 
the jurisdiction. This means that despite the links now being 
demonstrated in other jurisdictions about the relationship 
between pre and post-conflict violence for women,113 the capacity 
to undertake that assessment in Cyprus is very limited. 
IV. FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE UNDER 
OCCUPATION 
Challenges of marriage, divorce, and inheritance in the 
context of the occupation are real and under-appreciated. In the 
broader literature on the law of occupation, they scarcely merit 
consideration.114 The Cypriot occupation thus offers insight into 
the complexity of these issues for women’s lived lives under 
occupation, which have relevance to multiple global sites of 
occupation. I suggest that these gendered aspects of day-to-day 
life are excluded from the law of occupation for three overlapping 
reasons. First, the law of occupation has broadly omitted issues 
of family, private life and sexual harm from its regulatory scope. 
The explanations for such absences are explained in part by the 
patriarchal and masculine sensibilities of these legal norms 
shaped by a broader historic absence of gender concerns from the 
law of armed conflict. Second, the law of occupation expressly 
functions in a frame of legal pluralism,115 whereby occupation 
law affirms the ongoing application of ‘local’ civil law to matters 
of intimate and family life ceding the private (in principle) to the 
prevailing legal order when territory is captured and occupied. 
 
Cyprus as a Tier 1 anti-trafficking country that fully complies with standards). 
 113. See Romi Sigsworth & Nahla Valji, Violence Against Women and the 
Limitations of Transitional Justice, in GENDER IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 115–
35, 115–19 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel & Ruth Stanley eds., 2012); see also 
Rashida Manjoo & Calleigh McRaith, Gender-Based Violence and Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas, 44 CORNELL L. J. 11 (2011) (asserting women 
are targeted for gender-based violence during conflicts and remain vulnerable 
to violence post-conflict). 
 114. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupational: 
Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006) 
(omitting any discussion of divorce, marriage, or human rights). 
 115. See generally Holly Dunn, The Transitional Justice Gap: Exploring 
‘Everyday’ Gendered Harms and Customary Justice in South Kivu, DR Congo, 
FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES, 1 (2016) (linking transitional justice measures with 
the co-existence of other legal systems, showing how women in particular move 
between the systems). 
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As will be addressed further below, this separation is often 
meaningless in practice as the legal fact of occupation invariably 
tests and limits the capacity of the prevailing legal order to 
function effectively or develop progressively. Finally, in 
transformative long-term occupations the legal gaps occasioned 
by the duration of the occupation can be theoretically remedied 
by the application of international human rights law.116 Here the 
progressive dimensions of human rights norms and 
jurisprudence could be used to ameliorate the limitations 
occasioned by the conservation principle contained in the law of 
armed conflict.117 However, states have positively resisted this 
move, notably the state of Israel’s undulating position that 
human rights norms do not apply in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories,118 despite consistent international legal 
jurisprudence which affirms otherwise.119 
All of these intersecting aspects contribute to the absence of 
a regulatory content for ‘private’ regulation in the law of armed 
conflict. In each occupation setting, other variables can 
contribute to the marginalization of gender and the under-
regulation of women’s lives. In Cyprus, the conflict intersection 
of ‘private’ matters has been elevated by the emphasis on 
property rights in the political negotiations to end the Cyprus 
 
 116. See e.g. Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the 
Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of 
Sevastopol (Ukraine), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (Sept. 25, 2017). The Human 
Rights Council tied the idea of family unity during occupation to the “right to 
family life” embedded within international instruments. Id. 
 117. See e.g. Kristin Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: Contours of Jus 
Post Bellum Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 
(2009). [Boon argues that a core aspect of the law of armed conflict is it 
conservatism. Boon argues that this principle is regressing particularly in the 
context of international administrations overlap with occupation law. This 
article argues that gender norms in occupation buck this trend and remain 
highly static. 
 118. Note recent position of Israel in its reporting to the CEDAW Committee: 
“It is Israel’s position that the CEDAW is not applicable beyond a State’s 
national territory,” and thus not applicable in the “Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.” Israel Report: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under 
Article 18 of the Convention Pursuant to the Simplified Reporting Procedure, ¶¶ 
8–13, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ISR/6 (July 14, 2017). 
 119. This view is affirmed in the position of the ICJ on the parallel 
application of Human Rights and Law of Armed conflict in situations of 
occupation. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Palestinian Wall Case), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 
2004 (July 9). 
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conflict and the occupation.120 To state the obvious, if there are 
issues of title concerning a disputed property that is subject to 
testy political negotiation then the significance of marital 
breakdown has a visibility in the conflict settings that it would 
otherwise lack, notwithstanding that the fact that conflict may 
significantly order the ways in which relationships are ended, 
and in which rights (including property rights) are enforced, or 
not.121 Anecdotally, in contrast with the occupation in 
Israel/Palestine, marriage across the divide is occurring (though 
infrequently),122 and there are no formal barriers to marriage 
and/or to living with one’s spouse post marriage on either side of 
the territorial divide.123 However, the reality of a formal border, 
passport checks and the complexity of managing legal 
relationships across these boundaries clearly affects the choice 
to marry and the ‘ease’ of private relationships and private 
ordering under occupation. The lack of common legal system 
across Cyprus and Occupied Territory is a formidable barrier to 
the resolution of family and women’s rights issues and enables a 
range of gendered abuses. In both parts of the Island, marriage 
is highly valued and deeply embedded in cultural-religious 
 
 120. See Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of 
Good Offices in Cyprus ¶ 6 U.N. Doc. S/2016/15 (Jan. 7, 2016); Agathangelou, 
supra note 89, at 15. 
 121. See generally Proukaki, supra note 30 (showing how diaspora has 
affected property rights); Williams, supra note 30 (explaining how property 
rights have been affected by international involvement in Cyprus as a result of 
occupation). 
 122. See Judy Maltz, Why Interfaith Marriage Is on the Rise in Israel—and 
Why It’s a Problem, HAARETZ (June 2, 2014, 10:19PM), https://www.haaretz.
com/jewish/shavuot/.premium-1.596678 (estimating 5-10% of all Israeli couples 
are in interfaith marriages and of the estimated almost 9,000 couples married 
overseas, Jewish-Arab couples made up only 0.03%); Raf Sanchez, What Is It 
Like to Be Married to an Arab in Israel?, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 11, 2016, 12:00PM 
GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/120904
39/What-is-it-like-to-be-a-Jew-married-to-an-Arab-in-Israel.html (estimating 
there are only a few hundred Jewish-Arab married couples in Israel). 
 123. See Jan Asmussen, Intermarriages and Interethnic Love Stories in 
Cyprus, HALKBILIMI (Jan. 2010), http://www.academia.edu/30910399/
Intermarriages_and_interethnic_love_stories_in_Cyprus (explaining the 
historical status of interfaith marriages in Cyprus). Compare Areti 
Dimosphenus, Marriages Between Christians and Muslims on Cyprus: Rights 
and Obligations of Women in a Muslim Family, ORTHOCHRISTIAN.COM (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2017), http://orthochristian.com/97969.html (discussing how 
1950s legislation concerning interfaith marriages has effected Christian women 
in Cyprus), with HCJ 466.07 MK Zahava Gal-On v. Attorney General 65(2) PD 
44 (2007) (Isr.) (preventing spouses in Israel from living within the Green Line 
if they are from Gaza). 
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identity.124 Hence, ramifications of the breakdown take on a 
visibility and significance that might not otherwise be the case 
in a non-conflict site. Moreover, functional relationships, despite 
the occupation, speak to the capacity of overcoming the religious 
and ethnic difference in the most intimate sites of life. Their 
failure can be read as illustrating not just the end of a particular 
marriage but rather a broader impossibility of a relationship 
between communities. Here the personal is potentially highly 
political. 
In the context of marriage breakdown, one of the issues 
strongly reported during my fieldwork was the practical issues 
that arose when navigating the end of or difficulties within a 
marital relationship across occupied and non-occupied territory. 
The obvious first challenge—given the lack of a common legal 
system—is that legal process to address dissolution, domestic 
violence, rights of access to children, financial maintenance or 
barring a spouse from home due to the threat or actuality of 
violence must be processed concurrently in two legal systems.125 
This invariably requires dual legal representation, as legal 
representation in both systems are entirely separate, and 
lawyers qualified to practice on Greek Cypriot territory are not 
recognized in the Occupied Territory and visa-versa. Leaving 
aside issues of duplication, the costs of paying lawyers in two 
jurisdictions can be prohibitively expensive for the average 
litigant, and women may suffer specific disadvantages in having 
access to funds because they may not have title to common 
marriage property, or may have difficulty accessing bank and 
 
 124. Note that Paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Republic’s Constitution reads: 
(a) a married woman shall belong to the Community to which her 
husband belongs. 
(b) a male or female child under the age of twenty-one who is not 
married shall belong to the Community to which his or her father 
belongs, or, if the father is unknown and he or she has not been 
adopted, to the Community to which his or her mother belongs. 
Rep. Cyprus Const. art. 2, ¶ 7.  
[This provision enables] . . . via the logic of patriliny, women as the 
property of men, law has come to mediate ethnicity and family life. 
Inter-ethnic marriages were effectively prohibited under the above 
provisions. The moment they took place they were no longer inter-
ethnic: Article 2.7 rendered the wife a co-ethnic of her husband.  
DEMETRIOU, supra note 58. 
 125. See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as A Mixed Legal System, J. CIV. L. 
STUD. 38, 66–70 (2013); MARTHA HAYES SAMPSON, ASSER INSTITUUT, 
ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY LAW JUDGMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REPORT 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, T.M.C. 4–5 (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/publications/docs/family_rights/cyprus_en.pdf. 
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other accounts in one part of the Island if living in another.126 In 
an interview with a prominent feminist lawyer, she described 
the process of constantly “manoeuvring around the rules.”127 
This lawyer describes her willingness to travel to the North to 
be in the Courts where her clients were engaging the Northern 
legal system in divorce or custody proceedings, as an “act of 
solidarity;” her presence had a psychological effect on the court 
as she served as a witness to the proceedings. However, the same 
lawyers also reported “not feeling protected” in the North and 
understood that there were psychological and practical 
challenges for lawyers to engage in this kind of advocacy for their 
clients across the occupation lines.128 Moreover, in contentious 
divorce or domestic violence proceedings, a social worker will be 
designated in each jurisdiction for any children, but welfare 
officers in each part of the divided island do not have the 
authority to visit the other part, so any assessment of family life 
is only applicable in its own part of the Island.129 Where there 
are conflicted assessments there exists no agreed mechanism to 
resolve them, only the unpredictability of court proceedings. In 
the best-case scenario, there will be informal information 
sharing between legal officers; and in the worst-case scenario, 
none at all. 
One highly charged issue that has emerged in marriage 
dissolution is the issue of child access. For example, issues arise 
where parents live on different sides of the buffer/demilitarized 
zone, or where one holds a foreign passport, or where a child lives 
on one side of the demilitarized zone but attends school on the 
other. Anecdotal reports indicate that there has been a practice 
for alienated spouses (mostly men) to place their children on a 
“stop list” with local authorities.130 This mechanism, which is a 
procedure under the Hague Convention, is intended to be a 
safety mechanism to prevent a child from exiting a jurisdiction 
 
 126. Interview with Cyprian personnel that the author wishes to keep 
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Sept. 29,2016). 
 127. Interview with Cyprian lawyer that the author wishes to keep 
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Sept. 29, 2016) [hereinafter 
Cyprian Lawyer Interview]. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See MPs Call for Action Over Abducted Children, CYPRUS MAIL ONLINE 
(June 3, 2014), http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/06/03/mps-call-for-action-over-
abducted-children/; Travel Documents for Minors—Cyprus, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/travel/entry-exit/eu-citizen/cyprus/
index_en.htm. 
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without the consent of a parent.131 The stop list only formally 
applies to legal ports of entry. In the North, however, a father 
does not have to go to Court to prevent travel of a child from the 
North to the South; the father can simply give a notarized note 
to the border crossing agents because the Northern Cypriot 
authorities view the border as an ‘international’ border, and to 
cross this border a child must be accompanied by a parent or 
authorized adult, with the consent of both parents.132 This would 
prevent a child from crossing to attend school, to live with her 
mother (if her home was in the Greek Cypriot part of the Island) 
or visit extended family. The individual (often the male spouse) 
in the North thus has the effective power of the state, in a 
context where the state itself is not recognized beyond its 
borders. To lift the ban, a plaintiff must go to court, and 
generally, this process takes about eighteen months, with all of 
the attendant costs and challenges involved.133 Practically, a 
court Bailiff in the Greek Cypriot part of the Island cannot 
deliver or enforce legal orders in the North. E-mail may be the 
only form of communication but is not effective for legal 
enforcement.134 This particular issue underscores the lived 
consequences of the occupation and division that accompanies it 
for the regulation of family life, and the harsh consequences for 
women when marriages end. The invisibility of these issues to 
the legal regulation of sites of occupation is also striking, and the 
relative disinterest of legal scholars in the nexus between 
domestic civil law and the overlay of the occupation regimes 
ignored. 
Broadly defined, the family law provisions to be followed in 
both parts of the Island are the same, and are drawn from 
British colonial legislation135 and the binding precedent in 
 
 131. See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89. 
 132. Cyprian lawyer Interview, supra note 127. 
 133. See Maria Pilikou, The International Comparative Legal Guide to: 
Litigation & Dispute Resolution 2011, GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP 75, 
http://www.chrysostomides.com.cy/assets/modules/chr/publications/14/docs/cyp
rus_chapter.pdf (2011) (“Normally, civil proceedings take between 2-3 years, 
depending on the Court’s workload and/or delaying tactics of the Defendant.”). 
 134. Civil Procedure Rules Order 2 (Cyprus) http://www.cypruslaw.narod.
ru/laws/CYPRUS_CIVIL_PROCEDURE_RULES.doc. See Christos Clerides, 
Civil Law and Procedures, CYPRUS L. DIG. (Dec. 13, 2012) http://www.cyprus
lawdigest.com/topics/judicial-system/item/133-civil-law-and-procedures. 
 135. Until 1990, all the relevant “family law” provisions were enacted during 
British sovereignty in Cyprus. See Eliana Nicolaou, Cyprus: Recent 
Developments in Family Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW: 
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British and Cypriot systems. Once a legal action has commenced 
in divorce or family law proceedings, there is no formal system 
of sharing information across the legal systems in place in the 
occupied and non-occupied portions of the territory. In situations 
of domestic violence, this informal sharing is at best insufficient, 
and at worst can contribute to the legal isolation and physical 
vulnerability of the battered woman. In the best cases, lawyers 
will share information informally. Because divorce proceedings 
and decrees and/or barring orders issued in the North are not 
binding in the Greek Cypriot territory, legal actors are not 
incentivized to cooperate. Conversely, if a domestic dispute or 
divorce involves proceedings in the Greek Cypriot territory and 
one party chooses not to attend, the Court has the authority to 
proceed in his/her absence.136 Moreover, any orders issued 
including the provisions of maintenance, safety or barring 
orders, payment of fees, custodial arrangements as regards 
children have no mechanism of enforcement across the 
demilitarised zone, making the Court orders extremely difficult 
to administer in practice.137 Thus, maintenance orders across 
the divide do not specify the means to enforce them, resulting in 
dysfunctional payment methods and this means that there is no 
formal means to track payment or non-payment, further 
weakening enforcement.138 To compound matters, one cannot 
easily transfer monies from a bank account in the South to the 
North, making the provision of maintenance across the divide 
extremely fraught.139 For Judges in family law cases who are 
 
1996 121, 121–34 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1998). The Turkish community 
initially had their own provisions under the Turkish Family and Divorce Law 
of 1951. Id. With the adoption of civil marriage in Greece, Cyprus underwent 
modernization and streamlined “family law” in 1990. Id. at 125–26. Although 
the Civil Marriage Law of 1990 initially defined “marriage” as between persons 
who belong to the Greek community, it was amended in 2002 to include any 
parties married under the law. O Peri Efarmogis tou peri Gamou Nomou, Kef. 
279, se Meli tis Tourkikis Koinotitas [The Implementation of the Marriage Law, 
Cap. 279, to Members of the Turkish Community], (Law 46(I)/2002) (Cyprus). 
See Sampson, supra note 125, at 4–5. 
 136. See, e.g., Zenonos v. Zissaki, (2009) 1 A.A.D. 661, (Cyprus) (detailing a 
case where the father contested the mother’s actions, and the mother never 
appeared; The district court continued without her and ordered the mother to 
return the children to Cyprus from Greece). 
 137. See D v. D [2016] EWHC 3546, [3]–[5] (Fam) (Eng.) (discussing child 
support payments ordered in TRNC). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., TRNC Banks Will Monitor All Transfers from the South, LGC 
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2013) http://www.lgcnews.com/trnc-banks-will-monitor-all-
transfers-from-the-south/. 
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aware of the dual proceedings, there is an informal practice of 
asking legal counsel what stage the process may be at; 
occasionally, judges may be willing to lock-step proceedings 
across the divide. But such lock-stepping is highly dependent on 
each judge’s individualized decision; judges are more likely to let 
parallel proceedings in both jurisdictions, even if both 
proceedings may move at the same pace and produce similar 
findings/outcomes likely.140 Where this is not the case, the 
individual plaintiff is at a significant disadvantage. Notably, any 
decision from a Greek Cypriot court has legal validity outside 
the Island and is internationally enforceable; decisions from the 
Occupied Northern Territory do not have international legal 
recognition.141 Interviews revealed how the nonrecognition of 
legal orders in the occupied territory had been used to slow 
down, or create further uncertainty in highly contentious divorce 
and / or domestic violence proceedings.142 
The fact of separate legal systems, a product of long-term 
and sustained occupation, has deep consequences across all 
facets of the legal system, including for family law practices. At 
a human level, the best interest of the child in family matters is 
clearly compromised.143 There is also increasing awareness that 
marital disputes and family law arrangements, which are often 
gender-stratified, compound gender-based dispossession for 
women, leaving little or no access to the financial resources of 
the marriage, including property.144 It is only relatively recently 
 
 140. Interview with Cyprian lawyer that the author wishes to keep 
anonymous. Sources verified by the Journal. (Sept. 29, 2016) (revealing how the 
lack of recognition for legal orders in the occupied territory had been used to 
slow down, or create further uncertainty in highly contentious divorce and/or 
domestic violence proceedings). 
 141. Anastasios A. Antoniou, Litigation and Enforcement in Cyprus: 
Overview, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (Sep. 1, 2015) 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-502-0202?transitionType=
Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.y. 
 142. Cyprian Lawyer Interview, supra note 127. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally Richard Hauser & Roland Berntsen, Wife of Frau, Women 
Do Worse: A Comparison of Men and Women in the United States and Germany 
After Marital Dissolution, 28(3) DEMOGRAPHY 353 (1991) (concluding that 
family income for women undergoing divorce fell significantly more than family 
income for men in both the United States and Germany); Karen C. Holden, The 
Economic Costs of Marital Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate 
Cost?, 17 ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 51, 51 (1991) (exploring why divorce and 
widowhood have “negative and prolonged consequences for women’s economic 
well-being”); Wilfred Uunk, The Economic Consequences of Divorce for Women 
in the European Union: The Impact of Welfare State Arrangements, 20 EUR. J. 
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that these issues have emerged in the Gender Equality 
Technical Committee, and the Gender Advisory Team as both 
assess how in a post-conflict Cyprus such challenges be 
ameliorated taking account of the effects of the conflict. The 
Committee and women’s organizations recognize that in the 
context of challenges for women in divorce, family law, and 
custodial rights, the issues are not merely dismissed as 
individual patriarchal behavior; rather, individual behavior is 
supported by the occupation and the impunity for male behavior 
and control is enabled by the occupation.145 
As illustrated above, challenges faced by women as a result 
of the occupation and separation of Cyprus are numerous. For 
Turkish Cypriot women, there are the burdens of living in a 
territory which is not internationally recognized, being a 
minority community on the Island of Cyprus and not having the 
legal status of European Union citizens.146 For both Turkish and 
Greek Cypriot women there are deep commonalities of gendered 
exclusion, frozen patriarchies that accompany a frozen conflict, 
and the insidious ways in which the application of the law of 
armed conflict in a long-term transformative occupation means 
that the day-to-day issues that dominate women’s lives are 
either under-regulated or not regulated at all.147 Moreover, “the 
contradictions and weaknesses of international humanitarian 
law” enable the wholesale exclusion of many of the practices and 




POPULATION 251 (2004) (discussing the economic consequences of divorce for 
women and subsequent increased dependence on social welfare in the EU). 
 145. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on his 
Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/2016/15 (Jan. 7, 2016) 
(explaining the composition of the Committee). 
 146. Fatma Güven Lisaniler, Gender Equality in North Cyprus (Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus), 7 QUADERNS DE LA MEDITERRÀNIA [NOTEBOOKS 
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN] 133, 136 http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/
quaderns/7/133_Guven.pdf (2006). 
 147. Office of the Law Comm’r, Cyprus: Third, Fourth and Fifth Periodic 
Report (1993-2003) on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶¶ 9–10, U.N. 
Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/3-5 (Feb. 16, 2004). 
 148. GERSHON SHAFIR, A HALF CENTURY OF OCCUPATION: ISRAEL, 
PALESTINE, AND THE WORLD’S MOST INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 166 (2017). 
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A. TRAFFICKING AND OCCUPATION 
One highly insidious practice that has accompanied the 
occupation in Northern Cyprus is the emergence and 
consolidation of human trafficking as an established practice. 
The Fourth Geneva Convention does not regulate human 
trafficking in situations of occupation, nor was the existence of 
trafficking a meaningful issue in the negotiations of the 
Conventions or the Additional Protocols.149 However, as an 
opaque legal space in which local law and international law are 
in constant interaction and contestation, practices such as 
trafficking often thrive precisely because there is a legal grey 
zone that enables them to.150 The lack of legal recognition for the 
status of the territory in Northern Cyprus creates a gap in 
enforcement capacity for international organizations and 
NGO’s.151 With the state in abeyance, legal enforcement slips.152 
Moreover, Turkey continues to maintain a chimera of distance 
from the day-to-day administration of justice in the TRNC and 
its claims that the TRNC is an independent governance 
structure, which has control and responsibility for the 
enforcement of laws national and international further weakens 
the rule of law, and the meaningful enforcement of human rights 
and international norms.153 In this context, legal protection for 
a range of rights, including the right to be free from slavery, 
forced prostitution, sexual exploitation and gender-based 
 
 149. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
 150. See Olivia Enos, Human Trafficking Thrives Where Rule of Law Ends, 
HERITAGE FOUND. http://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/human-traffick
ing-thrives-where-rule-law-ends, (Mar. 17, 2015). 
 151. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 112. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See How Did the Situation Change After July 1974?, Republic of 
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/how-did-the-
situation-change-after-july-1974-_.en.mfa (describing how the “Turkish Cypriot 
people re-organized itself as a federated state . . . .”); Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Cyprus Issue, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: FOREIGN POLICY, http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/cyprus-issue-_summary_.en.mfa (“Cyprus is the home of two nations and 
there exist two democratically organized states in the island.”). 
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violence is constrained.154 These are also the kinds of conditions 
in which human trafficking thrives.155 
In 2013, the United States State Department placed Cyprus 
on the tier two watch-list for human trafficking, making it the 
only EU nation to be placed in this category.156 Since 2013, the 
Republic of Cyprus has worked along with European institutions 
to strengthen laws against human trafficking.157 Among the key 
provisions of the law has been a new National Act Plan to 
Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.158 This new National 
Action Plan provides specific targets and measures to seek to 
improve coordination, prevention, identification and recognition 
of victims, protection and support of victims, suppression and 
prosecution, data collection, training, international cooperation, 
and evaluation.159 In addition, following directives by the EU 
(2011/36/EU), Cyprus has established funds to assist victims of 
human trafficking and has participated in the EU program, 
“Towards a Pan European Monitoring System” that seeks to use 
an online platform to monitor human trafficking.160 Because of 
these efforts, the United States State Department has deemed 
that Cyprus is meeting the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking and is taking positive steps towards 
eliminating human trafficking.161 Notably, all of the efforts have 
been pursued in the Greek Cypriot part of the Island, which 
continues to underscore the enforcement gap in the TRNC.162 
Thus, the European Commission has stated that “the 
occupied part of Cyprus, in which the Republic of Cyprus does 
not exercise effective control, is increasingly a destination for 
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women from Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa who are 
subjected to forced prostitution in nightclubs.”163 Within 
Northern Cyprus, these nightclubs provide approximately $7 
million to $10 million annually in tax revenue.164 Furthermore, 
the State Department found that Turkish Cypriots do not have 
any specific laws against human trafficking and that the 
minimal laws in place against forced labor are not enforced and 
that victims who spoke out against trafficking were deported.165 
Northern Cyprus has yet to adopt any of the provisions 
recommended by the EU or the laws that have been 
implemented by the Republic of Cyprus and have been found to 
have done nothing to address these issues.166 To meet their 
obligations under the Council of Europe and the EU, it is likely 
that Northern Cyprus will have to take necessary steps to 
combat human trafficking, domestic violence, and other human 
rights violations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Cyprus case provides some valuable insights into the 
gendered dimensions of occupation, relevant for a broader 
reassessment of the extent to which occupation law is “fit for 
purpose” specifically as it regulates long-term transformative 
occupations.167 A key element of the Cyprus occupation is that it 
has been protracted and sustained.168 The law of occupation, in 
its original conceptualization, was assumed to have a short-term 
and utilitarian function, designed for the protection of land and 
people until the disputed territory was returned to its rightful 
sovereign.169 Long-term and belligerent territorial control of 
occupied territory has meant expanded patterns of exclusions 
and under-enforcement of law for women, and in particular, 
illustrates the opaque under-regulation of the private sphere 
under occupation, generally to the detriment of women’s 
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protection and entitlements.170 Hence, fundamental questions as 
to the adequacy of the law of occupation to address women’s 
needs and rights are exposed. 
In respect of the invasion and armed conflict that gave rise 
to occupation, the evidence of widespread sexual violence 
accentuates the relationship in many conflict sites between 
territorial conquest and sexual violence against women.171 Much 
less clear is the extent to which patterns of sexual violence in 
conflict persist in long-term and transformative occupations. 
The lack of data from the TRNC makes mapping those 
connections difficult, compounded by the lack of formal 
international recognition for the occupied territory limiting the 
extent of external legal and political oversight. This underscores 
a theme of this article, namely that the structure of the law of 
occupation can serve to occlude and compound harms against 
women rather than expose and open them up to scrutiny. 
Occupation can function as a shield to scrutiny rather than a 
sword of protection, notwithstanding its overt protective 
function under the laws of war. This Article sheds light on 
important aspects of family and personal life which are routinely 
ignored in accounts of occupation, and generally viewed as 
irrelevant to the protective function of this body of legal norms. 
The significance of this is more obvious with long-term ‘frozen’ 
conflicts when every aspect of human life is to some degree 
impinged upon by the occupation. It reveals further important 
distinctions between public and private regulation in the laws of 
war,172 whereby the private (here family life and intimate 
violence) are excluded from the regulatory sphere. This leaves 
these issues and the lives affected by them to the vicissitudes of 
the occupying power, who may not always be benevolent, but can 
reliably be assumed to be patriarchal. While the law of 
occupation is seen as peripheral to the bulk of armed conflict 
regulation, recall the number of recent and ongoing occupations 
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where lives are affected in similar ways including Israel-
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Western Sahara, and the 
Crimea.173 Closer gendered analysis of the law of occupation is 
long-overdue, as is timely reform of those aspects which are most 
detrimental to women’s lives, and augmentation to make the law 
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